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Abstract 
 This contribution addresses the question regarding the legal nature of 
a cryopreserved embryo. Such preservation is a relatively modern 
development in the medical field. Neither Tennessee (USA) law nor 
European law provides an acceptable explanation regarding its legal 
nature. It is argued herein that this is mainly due to the fact that rather 
unscientific language is applied. It is suggested that the using of 
concise legal terminology may contribute to a better understanding. 
The terms legal subject and object and legal subjectivity are well-
known and have definite legal content. By drawing an analogy between 
the legal status of an infant and such embryos, the conclusion is 
reached that embryos are not legal subjects sui iuris but indeed share 
the legal subjectivity of their parents. 
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I disagree that there's just a sliding scale of continuum with property at one 
point along the spectrum and human beings at another. I think there is sharp 
distinction between something that is property and something that is not 
property.1 
1 Introduction 
The difference between the concepts legal subject and object is 
progressively being challenged by developments in the medical science.2 In 
fact, in 1980 already Thomas complained about the law discipline’s lagging 
behind in a contribution – Can the lawyer keep up with the doctor?3 
Cryopreservation of fertilized ova, a procedure whereby an egg cell is 
removed from the mother, united with a sperm cell from the father after 
which the embryo is then cryogenically frozen some 48 to 72 hours after 
conception normally in liquid nitrogen is but one such challenging 
development.4 The frozen embryo can be thawed months or even years 
later and implanted into the uterus of the (not necessarily genetic) mother.5 
(For the sake of convenience and clarity the term embryo will be used as 
the reference for cryopreserved fertilised ova. In the various stages of the 
                                            
  Robbie Robinson. BJuris LLB LLD (PU vir CHO). Professor, Faculty of Law, North-
West University. E-mail: robbie.robinson@nwu.ac.za. 
1 Albert Gore quoted in Davis v Davis No E-14496, 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn Cir Ct 
Sept 21, 1989) para 9. 
2 The question when human life comes into being has been debated since time 
immemorial and theories that life begins at conception, at birth or at specific points 
of development in between (eg after the first trimester, when a point of viability has 
been reached, or at a point of so-called brain-birth) abound and are well 
documented. However, the dictum in Elliot v Joicey (1935) 238 quoted in Slabbert 
1997 JSAL 234 perhaps summarises the impasse between the theories best: "From 
earliest time the (unborn) child has caused a certain embarrassment to the logic of 
the law, which is naturally disposed to insist that at any given moment of time a child 
must either be born or not born, living or not living." 
3 Thomas 1980 SALJ 78-79. See Young 1991 Golden Gate UL Rev 559-562 for an 
explanation of reproductive technologies, which include artificial insemination, in 
vitro fertilisation, embryo transfer and the cryopreservation of embryos. 
4 Despite cryopreservation’s essentially being intertwined with legal issues such as 
abortion and the rights to privacy and to procreate, these will be discussed only when 
relevant and to the extent necessary to the primary question regarding the legal 
status of the embryo. See inter alia Robertson 1990 Virginia L Rev 437-517. 
5 See inter alia National Legal Research Group 2003 
http://www.divorcesource.com/research/dl/children/03mar54.shtml 1; Young 1991 
Golden Gate UL Rev 559. In the Circuit Court of Tennessee in the first Davis decision 
(see para 2.1 of this contribution) the cryopreservation process is described as one 
whereby several ova (unfertilised human eggs) are aspirated (a process by which 
ova are surgically withdrawn from the ovary) and inseminated (the process of placing 
together the sperm and the ovum) in a laboratory, and if the insemination process 
produces fertilised zygotes (fertilised ova) they can be allowed to mature in a 
laboratory to a medically accepted point for the purpose of either implantation (the 
process whereby the physician deposits a zygote in the human uterus) or 
cryopreservation. 
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pregnancy, different terms describe the product and some authors prefer to 
refer to it in this stage as a pre-embryo.)6 
In a variety of situations an issue regarding the embryo, whether it is a legal 
subject or object, is raised. However, further aspects also arising relate inter 
alia to the autonomy of parents to procreate, the contract with the institution 
(normally a clinic) storing the embryo, and whether the doctrine of estoppel 
finds application. In this contribution attention will be paid solely to the legal 
nature of the embryo. The South African legislature apparently views the 
embryo as a legal object7 and the so-called Davis judgments in Tennessee, 
USA will specifically be considered.8 The approach of the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee has been followed in other states of the USA, however.9 Also, 
in Israel10 and Europe substantial legal development has taken place and 
reference will also be made to a recent judgment of the European Court of 
Human Rights.11 
The term "status" is derived from the Latin verb stare – to stand. In the 
juridical sense of the word it relates to the position of the legal subject in 
legal reality ("regswerklikheid") or the role that it is capable of playing in legal 
intercourse.12 Against this background it would appear to be more 
appropriate to refer to the legal nature of the embryo. However, in view of 
                                            
6 See eg Jordaan 2005 SALJ 238; Slabbert 1997 SALJ 235. 
7 See para 4.1 of this contribution. 
8 Browne and Hynes 1991 J Legis 98; Breen-Portnoy 2013 Md J Int'l L 277 explains 
the lack of clarity and cohesion internationally on the issue. China, for instance 
officially maintains a one-child policy, yet there are indications that assisted 
reproductive technologies (hereafter ART) guidelines are being flouted, especially 
by the wealthy. In Western countries a full spectrum of approaches to ART is 
exhibited, but even countries such as Switzerland, Sweden and the UK, which 
regulate cryo-preservation, have no case law on the issue of the disposition of frozen 
embryos in situations of separation and divorce. See too Owen 1994 J Contemp 
Health L & Pol'y 497; Young 1991 Golden Gate UL Rev 560. 
9 Davis v Davis 842 SW 2d. Also see In re Marriage of Witten 672 NW 2d 768 (Iowa 
2003); AZ v BZ 725 NE 2d (Mass 2000); JB v MB 783 A 2d 707 (NJ 2001); Kass v 
Kass 696 NE 2d 174 (NY 1998); Litowitz v Litowitz 48 P3d 261 (Wash 2002). 
10 Breen-Portnoy 2013 Md J Int'l L 286 explains the rather surprisingly progressive 
position of Israel as "unapologetically pro-natalist". All Israeli women, irrespective of 
their marital status, have access to in vitro fertilisation for up to two children at little 
or no cost. In vitro fertilisation is included in the country's National Health Plan, which 
was instituted in 1996. She also points out that ART is one area of Israeli life in which 
religious and secular law and attitudes converge. The particular value that is placed 
on life contributes to significant support for an individual's right to be a parent. The 
conclusion is drawn that the State's efforts since the 1960's have transformed 
procreation from a "[p]rivate life quest into a public works project." 
11 See para 3 of this contribution. 
12 Van der Vyver and Joubert Persone- en Familiereg 53; Robinson et al Law of 
Persons 8. 
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the conclusion reached in paragraph 5 of this contribution, “status” will be 
used herein. 
2 American perspectives on the legal nature of the 
cryopreserved embryo – Davis v Davis 
In America, IVF (in vitro fertilisation) is regulated by federal law, and Davis 
v Davis in Tennessee serves as a clear illustration of the lack of clarity in 
the legal status of the frozen embryo. The case arose from the divorce 
proceedings of the Davis couple. The issue in question, albeit somewhat 
simplified, related to the disposition of seven frozen embryos in cryogenic 
storage. After several unsuccessful IVF procedures the cryopreservation 
technique was applied and two of the embryos were unsuccessfully 
implanted in Mrs Davis. The remaining seven were stored cryogenically for 
future implantation. At the time of the procedure the couple was informed 
that the likely storage life for the frozen embryos would be two years and 
that they could donate the remaining seven embryos to another couple. 
They made no decision at the time and did not sign any agreement with the 
clinic. In later divorce litigation Mrs Davis initially asked for control over the 
frozen embryos with the intention of having them transferred to her own 
uterus in a post-divorce effort to become pregnant. Mr Davis objected and 
preferred to leave the embryos in their frozen state until he decided whether 
or not he wanted to become a parent outside the bounds of marriage. This 
"custody" battle raised the question whether the pre-embryos13 should be 
considered as persons or as property. In coming to a decision, the position 
of the American Fertility Society was extensively referred to by the Supreme 
Court of Tennessee:14 
Three major ethical positions have been articulated in the debate over the 
pre-embryo status. At one extreme is the view of the pre-embryo as a human 
subject after fertilization, which requires that it be accorded the rights of a 
person. This position entails an obligation to provide an opportunity for 
implantation to occur and tends to ban any action before transfer that might 
harm the pre-embryo or that is not immediately therapeutic, such as freezing 
and some pre-embryo research (hereafter referred to as Position 1). 
At the opposite extreme is the view that the pre-embryo has a status no 
different from any other human tissue. With the consent of those who have 
decision-making authority over the pre-embryo, no limits should be imposed 
on actions taken with pre-embryos (hereafter referred to as Position 2). 
A third view – one that is most widely held – takes an intermediate position 
between the other two. It holds that the pre-embryo deserves respect greater 
                                            
13 See the discussion of Davis 3 in para 2.3. 
14 See the discussion of Davis 3 in para 2.3. 
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than that accorded to human tissue but not the respect accorded to actual 
persons. The pre-embryo is due greater respect than other human tissue 
because of its potential to become a person and because of its symbolic 
meaning for many people. Yet, it should not be treated as a person, because 
it has not yet developed the features of personhood, is not yet established 
as developmentally individual, and may never realize its biologic potential 
(hereafter referred to as Position 3). 
Davis v Davis15 (hereafter Davis 1) was the first case to deal with the specific 
issue. Davis 1 was revisited twice, namely in Davis v Davis16 (hereafter 
Davis 2) and Davis v Davis17 (hereafter Davis 3). Each of these courts 
adopted a different approach to the question. Essentially the saga related 
to the provisions of the Wrongful Death Statute,18 which prohibits the 
wrongful death of a "person." Hence, the distinction to be drawn is that 
between persons and property. 
2.1 Davis 1 
The court accepted that the Davis couple participated in the IVF programme 
for one single purpose – to produce a human being to be known as their 
child, and the facts were to show whether they accomplished their intent.19 
In order to come to a conclusion in this respect, the court held that the true 
question to be answered was when human life begins. In view of the medical 
evidence placed before it, the court identified two specific issues to address 
the primary question: (i) is there a difference between a pre-embryo and an 
embryo; and (ii) whether (pre-)embryos are property (that may eventually 
become human beings). Three eminent medical scholars who held different 
views on the question when life begins testified before the court. In coming 
to a decision, however, the court relied solely on the evidence of the expert 
who argued that a human being comes into existence directly after 
fertilisation. It must be noted, however, that even though the experts were 
not unanimous, they all agreed that the cryopreserved embryos were 
human; "[t]hat is belonging or relating to man; characteristic of man …"20 
                                            
15 Davis v Davis No E-14496, 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn Cir Ct Sept 21, 1989) (hereafter 
Davis 1). 
16 Davis v Davis No 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn Ct App 13, 1990) (hereafter Davis 2). 
17 Davis v Davis 842 SW 2d (hereafter Davis 3). The position in Davis 3 has been 
accepted quite widely in the USA, but for the purposes of the convenience hereof, 
reference will be made only to Davis. However, see In re Marriage of Witten 672 NW 
2d 768 (Iowa 2003); AZ v BZ 725 NE 2d (Mass 2000); JB v MB 783 A 2d 707 (NJ 
2001); Kass v Kass, 696 NE 2d 174 (NY 1998); Litowitz v Litowitz 48 P 3d 261 (Wash 
2002). 
18 Wrongful Death Statute Tenn Code Ann 20-5-106. 
19 Davis 1 para 3. 
20 Davis 1 para 4. See too the discussion of Browne and Hynes 1991 J Legis 113. She 
refers to Kelly v Gregory 282 App Div 542, 125 NYS 2d 696 (1953), where the New 
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2.1.1 Is there a difference between a pre-embryo and an embryo? 
The medical evidence placed before the court was not unanimous in this 
respect. One approach was to the effect that embryos are merely at a stage 
of development where they simply possess the potential for life.21 On the 
other hand the argument was put forward that human embryos are in 
""[b]eing"; they are "[i]n existence; conscious existence; as things brought 
into being by generation …" or “living, alive."22 After scrutiny of the evidence 
the court concluded that the term pre-embryo serves as a false 
distinguishing term. The cryopreserved entities are human embryos.23 In 
essence the court based its argument on the evidence regarding cell 
differentiation of the medical expert who rejected the argument that there is 
a difference between a pre-embryo and an embryo. It found that "[t]he life 
codes for each special, unique individual are resident at conception and 
animate the new person very soon after fertilization occurs."24 The cells of 
human embryos are comprised of differentiated cells; they are unique in 
character and specialised to the highest degree of distinction.25 In fact, the 
court accepted that 
                                            
York State Appellate Division explains that an important issue affecting the rights of 
the unborn is the separability of the unborn from its parents. If an embryo is merely 
the mother's tissue without its own identity, it would not make sense to assert that it 
has rights. However, an embryo is more than that. Legal separability should begin 
where there is biological separability. Separability begins at conception and even if 
the fetus may not live if its protection and nourishment are cut off earlier than the 
stage of viability, it is not to destroy its separability – it is rather to describe the 
conditions under which life will not continue. 
21 In this respect the testimony of the experts was to the effect that there is first a one 
cell gamete, a zygote (after the first cell divides), a pre-embryo (up to 14 days after 
fertilization) and after 14 days, an embryo. A pre-embryo according to this approach 
would then be a zygote up to 14 days which consists largely of undifferentiated cells. 
After attachment to the uterus wall and the appearance of the primitive streak, the 
cells become different and organs, organ systems and body parts are formed. At the 
time of fertilisation the genetic controls which determine who the embryo will later be 
are locked in. The argument in essence therefore is that the pre-embryo primarily 
consists of undifferentiated cells. Also see the discussion in Jordaan 2005 SALJ 238 
and Slabbert 1997 JSAL 237. 
22 Davis 1 para 3. 
23 Davis 1 para 6. There were various pro-and anti-difference arguments put before the 
court. One such argument ran that a human pre-embryo is an entity composed of a 
group of undifferentiated cells which have no organs or nervous system. At about 
10-14 days the pre-embryo attaches itself to the uteran wall, after which it develops 
a primitive streak, whereupon life commences – it is not clear “[t]hat a human pre-
embryo is a unique individual; that simply because fertilization has occurred, the 
gamete contributors have not procreated" (para 4). 
24 Davis 1 para 8. 
25 Davis 1 para 8. The conclusion of the court in this respect serves to reject the 
argument that the cells of a four-cell zygote are undifferentiated and that they lack 
any differentiation. The argument raised before the court was that even a skilled 
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There is no need for a subclass of the embryo to be called preembryo, 
because there is nothing before the embryo; before the embryo there is only 
a sperm and an egg; when the egg is fertilized by the sperm the entity 
becomes a zygote; and when the zygote divides it is an embryo. When the 
first cell exists, all the 'tricks of the trade' to build itself into an individual already 
exist. Shortly after fertilization at the three-cell stage a '… tiny human being 
….' exists. When the ovum is fertilized by the sperm, the result is '… the most 
specialized cell under the sun …', specialized from the point of view that no 
other cell will ever have the same instructions in the life of the individual being 
created.26 
2.1.2 Are (pre)embryos property or are they persons? 
Having accepted the medical evidence that the cells of human embryos are 
comprised of differentiated cells which are unique and specialised "[t]o the 
highest degree of distinction",27 the court reverted to the question whether 
the embryos are human beings. It concluded that they indeed are and that 
they definitely are not property.28 As a consequence human life begins at 
the moment of conception. However, the legal status of such embryos 
needs to be established and for such a purpose the court found that public 
policy does not prevent the continuing development of common law.29 It 
concluded therefore that "[n]o public policy prevents the continuing 
development as it may specifically apply to the seven human beings existing 
as embryos, in vitro, …" (own emphasis). As a result the doctrine of parens 
patriae controls these "children" as it has always supervised and controlled 
the children of a marriage at live birth in domestic relations cases.30 After 
referring to the intention of the parties to create children to be known as their 
family, the court found it in the best interests of the children in vitro that they 
be made available for implantation to assure their opportunity for live birth; 
implantation would be their only hope of survival. Furthermore, it would 
serve the best interests of these children for Mrs Davis to be permitted the 
opportunity to bring them to term through implantation.31 
                                            
scientist could not distinguish the cells of one zygote from those of another, nor could 
such a scientist distinguish between any of the four cells within the hypothetical 
zygote (para 7). 
26 Davis 1 para 5. 
27 Davis 1 para 8. 
28 Davis 1 para 9. 
29 Davis 1 para 10. 
30 Davis 1 para 10. The court explained the concept of parens patriae as the power of 
the sovereign to watch over the interests of those who are incapable of protecting 
themselves. The thrust of the doctrine is its focus on the best interests of the child; 
its concern is therefore not for those who claim “rights” to or custody of the child, and 
its sole objective is to achieve justice for the child (para 11). 
31 Davis 1 para 11. 
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2.1.3 Conclusion 
The court clearly identified Position 1 as the solution to the problem. In 
essence, the court's finding was that since there is no difference between 
pre-embryos and embryos, the medical evidence which argued that human 
life begins at the moment of conception must be correct. Therefore, the 
entities were not pre-embryos but indeed children in vitro. After invoking the 
doctrine of parens patriae, it was held that it would be in the best interests 
of the children to be born rather than destroyed. No public policy prevented 
the development of the common law in this respect. 
It is suggested that terms such as "children", "human beings" and "persons" 
reflect a rather generic application of terminology. Essentially these are 
unscientific terms which, it is submitted, contribute to the difficulty in 
explaining the status of the embryo. 
2.2 Davis 2 
In Davis 2 the Court of Appeals of Tennessee dealt with the matter on the 
basis of the following medical explanation: 
There are significant scientific distinctions between fertilized ova that have not 
been implanted and an embryo in the mother's womb. The fertilized ova at 
issue are between 4 and 8 cells. Genetically each cell is identical. 
Approximately three days after fertilization the cells begin to differentiate into 
an outer layer that will become the placenta and an inner layer that will 
become the embryo. This "blastocyst" can adhere to the uterine wall, the 
hallmark of pregnancy. Once adherence occurs, the inner embryonic layer 
reorganizes to form a rudimentary ‘axis’ along which major organs and 
structures of the body will be differentiated. It is important to remember that 
when these ova were fertilized through mechanical manipulation, their 
development was limited to the 8 cell stage. At this junction there is no 
development of the nervous system, the circulatory system, or the pulmonary 
system and it is thus possible for embryonic development to be indefinitely 
arrested at this stage by cryopreservation or freezing. … In IVF programs the 
embryo will be transferred to a uterus when it reaches the four-, six-, or eight-
cell stage, some forty-eight to seventy-two hours after conception. It is also at 
this stage that the embryo would be cryopreserved for later use.32 
The court proceeded to analyse Tennessee statutory law and concluded 
that as embryos develop they are accorded more respect than mere human 
cells because of their burgeoning potential for life. Yet, even after viability 
they do not have the legal status of a person already born.33 The court 
                                            
32 Davis 2 para 1. 
33 Davis 2 para 2.  
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therefore had no hesitation in ordering that Mr and Mrs Davis have "[j]oint 
control of the fertilized ova with equal voice over their disposition".34 
2.2.1 Conclusion 
It would appear that the Court of Appeals may have adopted the exposition 
in Position 2, even regarding the embryos as property.35 Though the court 
did not explicitly find that they were property,36 its awarding of joint control 
over them with an equal voice over their disposition bears out on such 
possibility. This conclusion is substantiated by the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee in Davis 3, where it was found that Davis 2's reliance on the 
dictum in York v Jones37 definitely left an impression that it considered the 
interests in the embryos of Mr and Mrs Davis as being of a property nature.38 
2.3 Davis 3 
According to the Supreme Court of Tennessee the essential dispute was 
not the status of the embryos but rather whether the parties would become 
parents. For this purpose the court focused strongly on the constitutional 
right to privacy, concluding that the right to procreational autonomy is 
composed of two rights – to procreation and to avoid procreation. However, 
turning to the debate regarding the legal status of the embryos, it explained 
that pre-embryos are neither persons, nor property. They occupy an interim 
category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for 
human life. It pointed out that semantical distinctions are important because 
language defines legal status and can limit legal rights. For example, the 
legal status of an adult is different from that of a child. It proceeded that 
"child" means something other than a "fetus", and a "fetus" differs from an 
                                            
34 Davis 2 para 3. Also see Owen 1994 J Contemp Health L & Pol'y 499. 
35 Davis 2 595. 
36 The court indeed found that a distinction had to be drawn between pre-embryos and 
embryos after it considered Tennessee statutory law. See Davis 2 594-595. 
37 York v Jones 717 F Supp 421 (ED Va 1989) 424-425. Also see the discussion in 
Browne and Hynes 1991 J Legis 102. 
38 In casu there was a dispute between the Yorks, a married couple who underwent 
IVF procedures, and the Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine in Virginia. The 
couple decided to relocate to California and asked the Institute to transfer a frozen 
embryo that they had produced to a fertility clinic in San Diego for later implantation. 
The Institute refused the request and the couple went to court. The federal district 
court assumed without deciding that the subject matter of the dispute was property. 
It found that the cryopreservation agreement created a bailment relationship which 
obliged the Institute to return the subject of the bailment to the couple once the 
purpose of the bailment had terminated. 
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"embryo". On this basis the court expressed criticism of Davis 1 where it 
was held that four-to-eight cell entities are embryos and not pre-embryos.39 
The court accepted the Davis 2 explanation that pre-embryos are not 
persons under Tennessee law, but rejected the implication of the decision 
that the interest of the parents "[i]s in the nature of a property interest."40 
This conclusion stemmed from the court's reference to statutory 
prescriptions reflecting the State of Tennessee's treatment of foetuses in 
the womb. 
We conclude that pre-embryos are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or 
'property,' but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect 
because of their potential for human life. It follows that any interest that Mary 
Sue Davis and Junior Davis have in the pre-embryos in this case is not a true 
property interest. However, they do have an interest in the nature of 
ownership, to the extent that they have decision-making authority concerning 
                                            
39 Davis 3 593. The court referred to a report of the American Fertility Society of June 
1990, which explains the development process as follows: "[a] new hereditary 
constitution (genome) contributed to by both parents through the union of sperm and 
egg. The stage subsequent to the zygote is cleavage, during which the single initial 
cell undergoes successive equal divisions with little or no intervening growth. As a 
result, the product cells (blastomeres) become successively smaller, while the size 
of the total aggregate of cells remains the same. After three such divisions, the 
aggregate contains eight cells in relatively loose association …. [E]ach blastomere, 
if separated from the others, has the potential to develop into a complete adult … 
Stated another way, at the 8-cell stage, the developmental singleness of one person 
has not been established. Beyond the 8-cell stage, individual blastomere begin to 
lose their zygote-like properties. Two divisions after the 8-cell stage, the 32 
blastomeres are increasingly adherent, closely packed, and no longer of equal 
developmental potential. The impression now conveyed is of a multicellular entity, 
rather than of a loose packet of identical cells. As the number of cells continues to 
increase, some are formed into a surface layer, surrounding others within. The outer 
layers have changed in properties toward trophoblast …, which is destined [to 
become part of the placenta]. The less- altered inner cells will be the source of the 
later embryo. The developing entity is now referred to as a blastocyst, characterized 
by a continuous peripheral layer of cells and a small cellular population within a 
central cavity … It is about this stage that the [normally] developing entity usually 
completes its transit through the oviduct to enter the uterus. Cell division continues 
and the blastocyst enlarges through increase of both cell number and [volume]. The 
populations of inner and outer cells become increasingly different, not only in position 
and shape but in synthetic activities as well. The change is primarily in the outer 
population, which is altering rapidly as the blastocyst interacts with and implants into 
the uterine wall … Thus, the first cellular differentiation of the new generation relates 
to physiologic interaction with the mother, rather than to the establishment of the 
embryo itself. It is for this reason that it is appropriate to refer to the developing entity 
up to this point as a preembryo, rather than an embryo." 
40 Davis 3 596. Also see the discussion of the judgment by Owen 1994 J Contemp 
Health L & Pol'y 502. 
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disposition of the pre-embryos, within the scope of policy set by law.41 (italics 
added) 
2.3.1 Conclusion 
The court in Davis 3 clearly opts for Position 3 – a middle-ground approach. 
It would appear that the embryos are viewed as being on a continuum 
somewhere between persons and property. This approach is out of step 
with Gore's exposition that there is a sharp distinction between something 
that is property and something that is not property.42 This preliminary 
conclusion raises further questions - what would the nature of the decision-
making authority concerning disposition be, and does it bear the same 
meaning as in ordinary property law? It is suggested that the policy set by 
law is rather vague and leaves a measure of uncertainty.43 Adding to the 
uncertainty is the conclusion drawn by the National Legal Research Group 
that "[f]rozen embryos have … been added to the list of unusual types of 
property with which divorce courts must contend."44 
3 The position of the European Court of Human Rights 
The European Court of Human Rights delivered judgment in the case of 
Parrillo v Italy45 on 27 August 2015. In casu the applicant wanted to donate 
                                            
41 Davis 3 597. The court referred to Roe v Wade 410 US 113, 705 at 731, where the 
Supreme Court explicitly refused to hold that a fetus possesses independent rights 
under law. It concluded that "[t]he unborn have never been recognized in the law as 
persons in the whole sense." At 159 the court further held that: "[W]e need not 
resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective 
disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any 
consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge is not 
in a position to speculate as to the answer." As for the state's interest in potential life, 
the court held that the compelling point is at viability, because the fetus then 
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb (at 163). 
Also see Webster v Reproductive Health Services 492 US 490. 
42 See introductory note. 
43 See Robertson 1990 Virginia L Rev 485. 
44 National Legal Research Group 2003 http://www.divorcesource.com/research/dl/ 
children/03mar54.shtml 1. Also see Kass v Kass 91 NY 2d 554, 673 NYS 2d 350 
(1998), which dealt with the interpretation of the consent form the parties had signed. 
It read as follows: "Our frozen pre-zygotes will not be released from storage for any 
purpose without the written consent of both of us … In the event of divorce … we 
understand that legal ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a 
property settlement and will be released as directed by order of a court …" (own 
italics). In Litowitz v Litowitz 146 Wash 2d 514, 48 P 3d 261 (2002) the issue before 
the court dealt with the provisions of a contract with the egg donor, which provided 
that "[A]ll eggs produced by the Egg Donor … shall be deemed the property of the 
Intended Parents and … the Intended Parents shall have the sole right to determine 
the disposition of said egg(s)." 
45 Case of Parrillo v Italy Application no 46470/11 (27 August 2015) (hereafter Parillo 
v Italy). 
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her and her deceased partner's embryos to scientific research. She relied 
on article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which provides that "[E]very natural or 
legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions …" The applicant, the director of 
the centre where the embryos were kept, refused to comply with her request 
on the grounds that this type of research was banned and punishable as a 
criminal offence under Italian statutory law.46 
The Italian Government submitted that the human embryo could not be 
regarded as a "thing" and that it was unacceptable to assign economic value 
to it. The Government observed that in the Italian legal system the human 
embryo was considered a "[s]ubject of law" entitled to the respect due to 
human dignity. The Government further argued that it was the approach of 
the Court to afford member states to the Convention a wide margin of 
appreciation regarding the determination of the beginning of life – 
particularly in areas where complex moral and ethical questions were at 
issue. The director's refusal consequently had not been a violation of article 
1 of the Protocol.47 
The applicant submitted that the embryos could not be regarded as 
"individuals" because if they were not implanted they were not destined to 
develop into foetuses and be born. Consequently, they were "possessions." 
She therefore contended that she had a right of ownership upon which the 
state had imposed restrictions.48 
The Court concluded that it is not necessary to establish when life begins, 
as article 2 of the Convention had not been placed in issue. However, the 
Court ruled that article 1 did not apply in casu – "[H]aving regard to the 
economic and pecuniary scope of the Article, human embryos cannot be 
reduced to ‘possessions’ within the meaning of that provision." This 
conclusion followed from the Court's observation that the concept of 
"possession" has an 
[a]utonomous meaning which is not limited to ownership of material goods … 
certain other rights and interests constituting assets can also be regarded as 
‘property rights’ and thus as ‘possessions’ … In each case the issue that 
needs to be examined is whether the circumstances of the case, considered 
                                            
46 Parrillo v Italy para 199. 
47 Parrillo v Italy paras 199-202. See too the approach of the European Centre for Law 
and Justice in para 205. It argued that the concept of “possession” had an inherently 
economic connotation which had to be ruled out in the case of human embryos. 
48 Parrillo v Italy para 203. 
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as a whole, conferred on the applicant title to a substantive interest protected 
by Article 1 of Protocol 1. (italics added)49 
The Court held that article 1 applies only to a person's existing possessions. 
Future income cannot be considered to be a "possession" unless it has 
already been earned or is definitely payable. Also the hope that a long-
extinguished property right may be revived cannot be viewed as 
"possession" and neither can a conditional claim which has lapsed as a 
result of a failure to fulfil the condition be regarded as a "possession." 
However, in certain circumstances a legitimate expectation of obtaining an 
asset may fall under the provisions of article 1. Where a proprietary interest 
for instance is in the nature of a claim, the person in whom it is vested may 
be regarded as having a legitimate expectation if there is a sufficient basis 
for the interest. However, despite this extensive interpretation that had 
previously been attached to the notion the court held that having regard to 
the economic and pecuniary scope of the provision, human embryos could 
not be reduced to possessions within its meaning.50 
It is suggested that the decision of the European Court of Human Rights is 
indicative of a strict interpretation of the provisions of the Protocol and 
leaves the question regarding the legal nature of the embryos open. It does 
little more than state the obvious. 
4 South African perspectives 
Seemingly relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 do not really provide an explanation of the legal status of 
embryos. Section 11 provides that everyone has the right to life and section 
12(2)(a) reads that everyone has the right to bodily and psychological 
integrity, which include the right inter alia to make decisions concerning 
reproduction. However, after Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa 
v Minister of Health,51 which reiterates in no uncertain terms that "everyone" 
does not include a foetus, it is clear that constitutional provisions do not 
have a direct bearing on the situation. 
4.1 Statutory provisions 
As will be discussed in paragraph 4.2 of this contribution, South African 
common law leaves little doubt that birth means living birth. This approach 
                                            
49 Parrillo v Italy paras 211 and 215. 
50 Parrillo v Italy para 215. 
51 Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v Minister of Health 1998 4 SA 1113 
(T). 
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is echoed by statutory provisions.52 Earlier enacted statutory law appears to 
take a more nuanced approach than common law and seems to indicate 
that embryos are accorded more respect than mere human cells (Position 
3) due to their burgeoning potential for life.53 The Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act54 for instance came into operation on 1 February 1997. It 
repealed the Abortion and Sterilisation Act55 to the extent that it was 
applicable to abortion. In accordance with section 2 of the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act, a pregnancy can be terminated during the 
first 12 weeks thereof at the request of the woman. From the thirteenth to 
the twentieth week, the pregnancy can be terminated if a medical 
practitioner, after consultation with the pregnant woman, is of the opinion 
that: 
 the continued pregnancy would pose a risk of injury to the woman's 
physical or mental health; or 
 there exists a substantial risk that the foetus would suffer from a severe 
physical or mental abnormality; or 
 the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest; or 
 the continued pregnancy would significantly affect the social or 
economic circumstances of the woman. 
After the 20th week, the pregnancy can be terminated if a medical 
practitioner, after consultation with another medical practitioner, registered 
midwife or registered nurse, is of the opinion that the continued pregnancy: 
 would endanger the woman's life; 
 would result in a severe malformation of the foetus; or 
                                            
52 See eg s 1 of the Registration of Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992, 
which provides that "birth" means the "[l]iving birth of a child." For a comprehensive 
discussion see Slabbert 1997 SALJ 246 et seq. 
53 Section 71(b) of the Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959 for instance provided that 
any prisoner whose release was expedient on grounds of advanced pregnancy could 
on recommendation of a medical officer be released by the Minister, either 
conditionally or unconditionally. This provision was not retained in the Correctional 
Services Act 111 of 1998. Regulation 26D of the regulations issued in terms of the 
Act provides for pregnant remand detainees. See GN R323 in GG 35277 of 25 April 
2012. 
54 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
55 Abortion and Sterilisation Act 2 of 1975. 
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 would pose a risk of injury to the foetus. 
From the provisions set out above it appears that even "advanced" foetuses 
in the mother's womb are not entitled to the same protection as persons. 
The provisions of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act indicate, 
however, that as embryos develop they are accorded more respect and 
protection than mere human cells.56 These progressive measures of respect 
and protection flow from the recognition of their burgeoning potential for life. 
On the other hand, though, it has expressly been stated by South African 
courts that the killing of an unborn child by a third party does not amount to 
murder.57 Only a living person can be killed, that is trite. Furthermore, one 
is certainly left with the impression that the Act promotes the interests of the 
mother qua living person rather than the interests of the unborn. 
The National Health Act 61 of 2003 also does not provide an unequivocal 
indication as to the legislator's viewpoints on the status of the embryo. 
Chapter eight, for instance, pertains to the control of the use of blood, blood 
products, tissue and gametes, and although terminology such as "acquire, 
use or supply", "remove", "manipulate", "transfer", "import and export" is 
used, it will be argued herein that the products should not be viewed as 
property in the sense of legal objects. It is furthermore submitted that despite 
the meaning of these terms typically relating to aspects of disposal by an 
owner (a legal subject) of a thing (a legal object) it cannot be the true 
intention of the legislature to accord ownership in the common law sense of 
the word. 
In 2016 the Regulations Relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons58 were 
published. Some indications that the embryo is viewed as property emerge 
inter alia from Regulation 18, which stipulates that – 
                                            
56 Such a conclusion is borne out inter alia by the preamble to the Act, which reads that 
the Act promotes reproductive rights and extends freedom of choice by affording 
every woman the right to choose whether to have an early, safe and legal termination 
of pregnancy. As the pregnancy develops the right diminishes, of course. 
57 S v Mshumpa 2008 1 SACR 126 (E) para [53]. In terms of s 239(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which relates to the killing of a newly born child. Proof is 
required that the child has breathed. 
58 GN R1165 in GG 40312 of 30 September 2016. Some guidance may also be 
gleaned from the provisions of the National Health Act 61 of 2003. S 57(4) implicitly 
prohibits embryo research. However, permission may be obtained by written 
application to the minister for research on stem cells and zygotes which are not more 
than 14 days old. It needs to be noted that this approach of the legislature follows on 
previous regulations in Reg 26 in GN R179 in GN 35099 of 2 March 2012 
(Regulations regarding the general control of human bodies, tissue, blood and blood 
products and gametes). This provision reads that "[A]ny person who acquires the 
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18(1) Before artificial fertilisation, the ownership of a gamete donated for the 
purpose of artificial fertilisation is vested – 
(a) in the case of a male donor but 
(i) before receipt of such gamete by the authorised institution to effect 
artificial fertilisation by the authorised institution which removed or 
withdrew the gamete; and 
(ii) after receipt of such gamete by the authorised institution that intends to 
effect artificial fertilisation, in that institution; 
(b) in the case of a male gamete donor for the artificial fertilisation of his 
spouse, in the male gamete donor; and 
(c) in the case of a female gamete donor, for the artificial fertilisation of a 
recipient, in that female donor. 
(2) After artificial fertilisation, the ownership of a zygote or embryo effected 
by donation of male and female gametes is vested – 
(a) in the case of a male gamete donor, in the recipient; and 
(b) in the case of a female donor, in the recipient. (italics added) 
It is suggested that a careful approach needs to be adopted when 
considering the true intention of the legislature reflected by the Act and 
Regulations. Per definition, the exposition implies that embryos are property 
since only qua property is it susceptible of ownership. Should this have been 
the true intention, it speaks for itself that it would bring legal certainty not 
only to the status of the embryo but also to the issue of the ownership 
thereof. However, it is suggested that these provisions should not be 
understood as conveying a clear intention on the part of the legislature. In 
fact, it is submitted that the wording is instead indicative of a lack of apposite 
terminology to convey the true nature of the relationship. In the first place, 
one of the rules pertaining to the interpretation of statutes makes it clear that 
the legislator must alter the common law explicitly if it wishes to do so.59 It 
goes without saying that the wording of the Act and Regulations does not 
meet this requirement. In the second place, Van Niekerk60 points out that 
the Regulations fail to mention those instances where embryos are being 
cryo-preserved for future use. Although fertilisation has taken place it is 
possible that no one qualifies as a recipient as defined in the Regulations. 
If no such person has been nominated, therefore the Regulations do not 
provide an answer. She furthermore expresses doubts as to the correctness 
of the term ownership and concludes that it is problematic and should be 
replaced with the term "proprietary interest". 
                                            
body of a deceased person or any tissue, blood or gamete, shall acquire exclusive 
rights in respect thereof." Also see Mahesh 2015 SAJBL 11. 
59 See eg Gordon v Standard Merchant Bank 1983 3 SA 68 (AD); Seluka v Suskin and 
Salkow 1912 TPD 265 and Johannesburg Municipality v Cohen's Trustees 1909 TS 
811, where the court explained on 823 that "[I]t is a sound rule to construe a statute 
in conformity with the common law rather than against it, except where and so far as 
the statute is plainly intended to alter the course of the common law." (italics added) 
60 Van Niekerk 2017 Obiter 170. 
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An embryo is defined in the NHA (National Health Act) as "… a human 
offspring in the first 8 weeks from conception" and in the Regulations 
Relating to the Import and Export of Human Tissue, Blood, Blood products, 
Cultured cells, Stem cells, Embryos, Foetal tissue, Zygotes and Gametes 
as "… a human offspring in the first 8 weeks of conception". Despite these 
operational definitions (the latter of which is conceptually confusing i.e. "of 
conception"), our current legislation does not provide any guidance on 
whether an embryo may fulfil the requirements to be categorised as 
property. Therefore, the exact characterisation of an embryo in South 
African law remains unknown and will have to be dealt with on a case-by-
case basis, taking into consideration relevant factors. It is submitted that the 
use of the word "ownership" in the NHA Regulations is problematic and that 
it should have been replaced with a "proprietary interest", which denotes 
something different from the legal understanding of ownership.61 
4.2 Jurisprudential interpretations of the common law 
4.2.1 The legal subject 
South African common law leaves little doubt that birth means living birth.62 
Birth is also the moment when legal subjectivity comes into being. Legal 
subjectivity as the characteristic defining a legal subject describes the 
qualities over which an entity disposes in order to participate in legal 
intercourse as a subject and not an object.63 Essentially, this entails 
disposing of the capacity to be the bearer of juridical competencies, 
subjective rights and capacities.64 
The requirements for birth qua moment of coming into existence of 
subjectivity are regulated by common law. From the writings of Voet65 in 
particular, it would appear that there are only two requirements for birth. 
                                            
61 Mahomed, Nöthling-Slabbert and Pepper 2013 SAJBL 19 also express serious 
doubts that ownership in the legal-technical sense was the true intention of the 
legislator. Also see Van Niekerk 2017 Obiter 170. 
62 Road Accident Fund v Mtati 2005 6 SA 215 (SCA). Also see S v Mshumpa 2008 1 
SACR 126 (E) for an exposition of criminal law on the question when life begins. 
63 See Van der Vyver and Joubert Persone- en Familiereg 33. 
64 Davel and Jordaan Law of Persons 3. Also see Cornescu 2010 Annals Constantin 
Brancusi U Targu Jiu Juridical Sci Series 139. 
65 See Van der Vyver and Joubert Persone- en Familiereg 35. It is suggested that the 
extra-corporeal embryo cannot be included in this exposition of birth. This is due to 
its rudimentary biological status and also because it must be transferred to a uterus 
for development and eventually birth to occur. 
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a) In the first place the foetus must be separate from the mother's body. 
The cutting of the umbilical cord need not have taken place. The 
completion of the birth is also not influenced by the use of scientific 
aids or by the death of the mother.66 
b) In the second place the foetus must have lived independently after 
its separation from the mother's body. Any sign of life, even if only for 
a moment, may serve as evidence in this regard. If it can, for 
example, be proven that the child had breathed or cried or that there 
had been a perceptible heartbeat, the child can be deemed to have 
lived. Medical evidence will naturally be important in this regard. 
Viability is not a requirement for birth.67 
By interpreting the so-called nasciturus fiction68 to include delictual claims 
for the unborn, some authors have concluded that it extended legal 
subjectivity to the unborn.69 This response followed the decision in Pinchin 
v Santam Insurance Co Ltd,70 where the court held that: 
[T]he point remains whether the fiction … must with any good reason be 
limited to the law of property. Why should an unborn infant be regarded as a 
person for the purposes of property but not for life and limb? I see no reason 
for limiting the fiction in this way, and the old authorities did not expressly limit 
it. It is probably because the state of medical knowledge at the time did not 
make it possible to prove a causal link between pre-natal injury and a post-
natal condition that it did not occur to them to deal with this situation.71 
                                            
66 This requirement follows logically from D 25.4.1.1: partus enim antequam edatur, 
mulieris portio est vel viscerum. (because the child is part of the woman or her 
insides before it is born). 
67 Van der Vyver and Joubert Persone- en Familiereg 60; Davel and Jordaan Law of 
Persons 13 indicate that certain authors also set a third requirement for birth, namely 
the requirement of viability. Viability means that the child must have reached such a 
stage of development within the mother's body that he or she could live 
independently, with or without aids, but without being fed from the mother's 
bloodstream. In essence this requirement has to do with the stage of development 
of the child's most important organs. There is no unanimity regarding the question of 
whether or not viability was a requirement for birth in Roman law. It was not stressed 
as a requirement in Roman Dutch law, however, and Van der Vyver and Joubert 
Persone- en Familiereg 61 come to the conclusion that it can be accepted with 
reasonable certainty that viability was not a requirement for birth in the legal technical 
sense. Also in South African law there exist no grounds to assume that a child has 
to be viable at birth in order to be considered a legal subject. 
68 Common law has three requirements for the application of the adage: (1) it must be 
to the advantage of the nasciturus. If the nasciturus in question will gain a benefit 
from the application of the adage, it can be applied; (2) the benefit must accrue to 
the nasciturus after the date of conception; and (3) the nasciturus must eventually 
be born in a legal-technical sense. 
69 See eg Van der Merwe and Joubert 1963 THRHR 293; Van der Vyver and Joubert 
Persone- en Familiereg 64. 
70 Pinchin v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1963 2 SA 254 (W). 
71 Pinchin v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1963 2 SA 254 (W) 259D. 
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I hold that a child does have an action to recover damages for pre-natal 
injuries. This view is based on the rule of the Roman law, received into our 
law, that an unborn child, if subsequently born alive, is deemed to have all the 
rights of a born child, whenever this is to its advantage. There is apparently 
no reason to limit this rule to the law of property and to exclude it from the law 
of delict.72 
This view was emphatically rejected in Road Accident Fund v Mtati.73 In 
casu the legal question specifically related to the Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accidents Fund Act 93 of 1989, which prescribed that the Fund is under an 
obligation to compensate any "person" for damages as a result of injury. 
The question was whether a nasciturus was a person for the purposes of 
the Act. The court referred to foreign authority and quoted with approval as 
follows from the Canadian case in Martell v Merton and Sutton Health 
Authority:74 
In law and in logic no damage can have been caused to the plaintiff before the 
plaintiff existed. The damage was suffered by the plaintiff at the moment that, 
in law, the plaintiff achieved personality and inherited the damaged body for 
which the defendants … were responsible. The events prior to birth were mere 
links in the chain of causation between the defendants' assumed lack of skill 
and care and the consequential damage to the plaintiff.75 
It is clear, therefore, that specific requirements exist for the birth of an entity 
before it will be legally recognised as a (natural) legal subject. An embryo 
does not meet these requirements and clearly cannot be regarded as a legal 
subject. 
4.2.2 The legal object 
It is commonly accepted that Herman Dooyweerd was a prominent 
exponent of the theory of subjective rights as it is applied in South African 
law. In essence he taught that subjective rights vest in a legal subject the 
entitlement to dispose of an object ("beschikkingsbevoegdheid") and an 
entitlement to enjoy and benefit from the use or control of the object 
("genotsbevoegdheid"). In this sense the legal entitlements define the 
relationship between a legal subject and object. His theory flows from his 
systematic philosophy of the created order, in which he distinguished fifteen 
distinct and irreducible modal aspects which all creatures display. Each of 
                                            
72 Pinchin v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1963 2 SA 254 (W) 260B. 
73 Road Accident Fund v Mtati 2005 6 SA 215 (SCA). Also see Christian Lawyers 
Association v Minister of Health 2005 1 SA 509 (TPD). 
74 Martell v Merton and Sutton Health Authority 1992 3 All ER 820 (QB). 
75 Martell v Merton and Sutton Health Authority 1992 3 All ER 820 (QB) para 31. The 
court followed the line of argument of Van der Merwe and Joubert 1963 THRHR 296 
that delicts typically comprise of different elements which may be removed in time 
and space. 
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these modal aspects is sovereign and builds on the ones below it. Modal 
laws govern the functions of creatures in each aspect – inorganic things are 
subject to the first four modal laws of number, space, motion and energy; 
plants are subject to the first five laws through the following modality of the 
biotic, animals to the first six laws through the next modality of the psychic 
and (only) human beings are subject to all fifteen modal laws, including the 
logical, historical, lingual, social, economic, aesthetic, juridical, moral and 
pistical aspects.76 Van Zyl and Van der Vyver77 therefore conclude that: 
Die mens in sy volheid is nooit 'n regsobjek nie en tree in al die wetskringe op 
as regsubjek. Die mens is by uitstek 'n religieuse wese (iemand wat in 'n 
direkte verhouding tot God staan; wat vir al sy doen en late teenoor God 
toerekenbaar en verantwoordelik is; wat in die kern van sy bestaan die tyd 
transendeer). As sodanig kan die mens nooit geobjektiveer word nie. 
The legal object is typically viewed as "[p]rimair de juridische objectiveering 
van een economisch belang voor een rechtssubject."78 In principle anything 
that is capable of being valued in economic terms can be a legal object. 
Economic value is not only monetary value but may also include things that 
are scarce or useful. It relates to Dooyeweerd's explanation in terms of 
which the economic aspect of reality ("[d]e economische wetskring in de 
                                            
76 Dooyeweerd De Wijsbegeerte 405. Also see Witte 1993 SALJ 550. Witte provides a 
thorough summary of Dooyeweerd's theory. 
77 Van Zyl and Van der Vyver Inleiding tot die Regswetenskap 41. Roughly translated 
this explanation conveys that the human being in his/her fullness can never be a 
legal object and acts as a legal subject in all modalities. The human being per 
definition is a religious being (someone who stands in a direct relationship to God 
and who is accountable to God for all his/her action and inaction. In the essence of 
his/her existence he/she transcends time and can therefore never be objectified.) 
78 For the purposes hereof it will be accepted that an economic interest is the true 
qualification for an entity. There is, however, a difference of opinion in this respect, 
and some authors conclude that not only economic value but all values of all the 
aspects preceding the juridical should be considered. See inter alia Van Zyl and Van 
der Vyver Inleiding tot die Regswetenskap 406; Joubert 1958 THRHR 108; Van der 
Vyver and Joubert Persone- en Familiereg 10. Also see Bahadur 2002 Human 
Reproduction 2770, who explains that while sperm has not specifically been 
classified as property in the sense that it cannot be passed on like a chattel, UK and 
European laws seem unclear on its status. Human body parts or products cannot be 
sold for profit, yet in transporting such body parts or products across EU countries, 
sperm is classified as “goods” and unavoidably becomes property. The conclusion 
is reached that even though the embryo is often regarded as being special it is not 
accorded special legal status. Also see Owen 1994 J Contemp Health L & Pol'y 500. 
Owen refers to Del Zio v Presbyterian Hospital of New York No 74-3588 (SDNY Nov 
14, 1978), where the court rejected a claim for economic loss due to the wrongful 
destruction of embryos by a hospital. Instead, damages were awarded for emotional 
distress. 
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kosmische orde") immediately precedes the juridical aspect of reality, and 
economic value must hence be understood in terms of relative scarcity.79 
In view of the exposition above it would appear that the fundamental 
difference between a legal subject and object is reflected in the fact that the 
human being ("mens") functions in his/her fullness ("volheid") in all modal 
aspects; also those that transcend the economic sphere, namely the 
juridical, moral and pistical. In contradistinction to the position of the legal 
subject, the legal object cannot function as the subject in these aspects. As 
a consequence it is suggested that the embryo, even though it appears 
prima facie to meet the requirement of economic scarcity, is not a legal 
subject. 
4.3 The views of authors 
A number of South African authors have involved themselves with various 
aspects regarding the embryo. Reference will be made to more recent 
contributions. 
4.3.1 Jordaan 
Jordaan approaches the question regarding the status of the embryo with 
reference to its moral status – is it wrong to harm the embryo? He relates to 
Kantian terminology by asking whether the embryo has intrinsic worth that 
makes it inherently worthy of protection.80 In order to come to a conclusion 
he develops an argument that the embryo is not inherently worthy of 
protection.81 After explaining foetal development in clear, elucidating 
terminology he rejects "traditional" arguments that the embryo is human 
life82 or potential human life that must be protected:83 
                                            
79 Dooyeweerd De Wijsbegeerte 405. 
80 Jordaan 2005 SALJ 241; Jordaan 2007 SALJ 625. This rather blunt formulation of 
course gives rise to uncertainty. Suffice it simply to say that both legal objects and 
subjects are worthy of protection. What is not worthy of protection is therefore 
something that falls outside of these categories. 
81 Jordaan 2005 SALJ 249. 
82 Jordaan 2005 SALJ 241 et seq. He concludes on the basis of Clarke v Hurst 1992 4 
SA 630 (D) that a distinction needs to be drawn between "biological life" and "human 
life." He accepts the conceptual distinction drawn by the court of allocating less moral 
value to biological life than to human life. It is suggested that while this line of 
argument may hold water for cases of passive euthanasia it should not be applied in 
instances of active euthanasia or murder. Would it not be murder as per the definition 
of the felony if a terminally ill person was killed intentionally? 
83 These were, mutatis mutandis, the conclusions of the courts in Davis 1 and 3 
respectively. See para 2 of this contribution. 
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I have also argued that if a particular stage of reproductive process is 
accorded more protection than earlier stage, there must exist a morally 
significant differentiating element between the two stages. On the premise that 
the gametes are not inherently worthy of protection, a morally significant 
differentiating element must therefore exist between the gametes and the pre-
embryo for the latter to qualify for any protection. … In the absence of a 
morally significant differentiating element, it must be concluded that the pre-
embryo is not inherently more worthy of protection than the gametes. The 
answer to the question 'what should the legal status of the pre-embryo be?' is 
therefore that the legal status of the pre-embryo should be the same as the 
gametes, namely that of being afforded no legal protection.84 
It is suggested that Jordaan does not really answer the question he sets out 
to address – the legal status of the pre-embryo. Concluding, as he does, 
that it is not inherently worthy of protection does not explain the legal status 
of the embryo and is in a similar vein to Parrillo. Clearly it is not a legal 
subject, but is it a legal object? Jordaan seems to argue that it is not even a 
legal object/property. What is it then? Or in more practical terms – what 
would the advice to be given to the Davis couple be? Their litigation is about 
something not recognised by law? Litigation regarding the nature of the 
embryo the world over illustrates the fallacy of this argument. It is suggested 
that the Kantian point of departure that Jordaan applies is perhaps not 
sufficiently nuanced to explain the status of the embryo. Furthermore and 
more practically - if one were to apply Jordaan's argument it is suggested 
that an agreement between parents or parents and a medical institution for 
cryopreservation would not have any significance as it relates (in legal 
terms) to nothing – the product of the performance contract would not be 
recognised by law. 
4.3.2 Slabbert 
The question Slabbert85 addresses is "[t]hat a definition of life must be 
attempted in the field of law, for the law needs to know what it is protecting." 
She concludes that theories regarding "personhood" do not provide a 
sufficient basis on which legal personality can be established. The 
conclusion she draws builds on the potential of the embryo and foetus to 
become human persons. She points out that the embryo and foetus have 
legitimate interests that deserve protection and that these interests can 
effectively be protected by steps short of constitutional protection. Such 
would include specific legislation and ethical guidelines. In fact, "[a] regime 
of protection has emerged with multiple tools adapted to different stages of 
humanlife, (sic!) different technologies and interests involved. …. [b]elieves 
                                            
84 Jordaan 2005 SALJ 249. He consequently concludes that the current legal position 
is morally sound and should be maintained. 
85 Slabbert 1997 JSAL 234. 
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that this type of protection, paradoxically provide better protection in the long 
run."86 It appears that Slabbert endorses Jordaan's conclusion that the law 
currently accords sufficient protection for the embryo (and foetus). 
Slabbert's criticism of theories which explain the nature of the embryo as 
property or as a person, similarly to that of Jordaan, is clear and 
comprehensively illustrates the philosophical and legal dimensions of the 
conundrum. However, it is suggested that in a situation where a decision 
needs to be taken whether the entity is a person or property (such as the 
case with the cryo-preserved embryo) a principled approach is required. 
Ambivalence in this regard may result in vastly different approaches 
regarding the protection afforded – would it be the object or subject of 
protection measures? As Van Niekerk quite correctly points out, parenthood 
brings with it responsibilities that cannot be ignored.87 
4.3.3 Lupton 
Lupton supports a so-called brain birth criterion as the moment when an 
entity can have interests – neither embryos, nor even mature organisms can 
have interests.88 He argues that the entity meeting the description of "[t]hat 
state of being which we can neither become nor cease to be without ceasing 
to exist" is "[I] have a brain." On this basis he concludes before the brain 
comes into existence (after a period of approximately 22 weeks of intra-
uterine development89) there is no human being to consider.90 
No one would disagree that it is wrong to deliberately kill a human being. From 
this it follows that unless the interests of another being are affected thereby it 
is morally permissible to do whatever one likes with a human embryo or foetus 
prior to the formation of its brain. This would include aborting it or 
experimenting on it. … [b]ut it would appear that society operates what, for 
want of a better term, can be described as a scale of revulsion which is in 
direct proportion to the stage of development (particularly mental 
development) …91 
Similarly to Jordaan, Lupton places strong emphasis on brain activity. 
However, it is submitted that while his explanation may be valid for the 
                                            
86 Slabbert 1997 JSAL 254. 
87 Van Niekerk 2017 Obiter 170. The focus of Van Niekerk's contribution pertains to the 
legal framework for addressing disputes involving frozen embryos and therefore only 
brief reference is paid to the status of the embryo. Essentially she elaborates on 
Positions 1-3, as explained in para 2 of this contribution. 
88 Lupton 1988 Acta Juridica 213. 
89 Lupton 1988 Acta Juridica 214. 
90 Lupton 1988 Acta Juridica 210. 
91 Lupton 1988 Acta Juridica 212. 
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foetus, it does not explain the nature of the embryo – what is it in a legal-
technical sense? 
5 Conclusion 
From the explanation above it is clear that the embryo is neither a legal 
subject sui iuris, nor a legal object. Qua sui generis entity it transcends the 
economic modal aspect as explained by Dooyeweerd and therefore cannot 
be viewed as a legal object. On the other hand it does not dispose of the 
capacity to be the bearer of juridical competences, subjective rights and 
capacities. From this perspective the judgment in Davis 3 that the parents 
"[h]ave an interest in the nature of ownership to the extent that they have 
decision-making authority concerning disposition of the pre-embryos"92 
needs to be considered carefully; prima facie human beings and property 
are viewed as entities on the two sides of a continuum and that embryos 
occupy an interim category somewhere on the continuum. On the other 
hand, one would tread dangerous grounds if one endeavoured to explain it 
exclusively as a legal subject sui iuris or legal object. For instance, if it were 
to be regarded as a subject it would of necessity mean that the embryo must 
be provided the opportunity for implantation and that it may not be destroyed 
or harmed. In the case of divorce it would also result in the embryo being 
viewed as a child of the marriage. If it were to be treated as a legal object, 
it would in all probability be classified as property ('n saak) – something over 
which there may be ownership. Such conclusion would lead to untenable 
results. For instance, would accessio be the way of acquiring ownership? In 
casu the sperm and egg belong to different owners which through accessio 
would become a single object that cannot be separated without injury. 
Furthermore it would seem that the nature of ownership would not be 
exclusive (absolute) but rather qualified.93 If exclusive it would belong to one 
owner exclusively to enjoy it and dispose of it in any manner not contrary to 
law. If qualified, it would belong to more than one person. 
Ownership of property entitles the owner to certain incidents of ownership. 
Owners have absolute dominion over their property and may do so as they 
choose with it. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the egg and sperm 
providers have decision-making authority and they are free to transfer their 
control to others. Arguably, then, the egg and sperm providers could do 
whatever they want with the frozen embryo. As owners, it would seem that 
they could implant the embryo, give the embryo away, dispose of the embryo, 
                                            
92 Davis 3 para [3].  
93  It is suggested that the absence of a provision in the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 that the consent of a father of an embryo is needed for an 
abortion serves as s strong indication that the legislature does not view the embryo 
as a legal object which has come into being by way of accessio. 
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and possibly even sell the embryo. The embryo might also be left frozen 
indefinitely.94 
The explanation above clearly explains the general characteristics of 
ownership and obviously would not apply sito sito in respect of the cryo-
preserved embryo. Proprietary rights are typically restricted to reasonable 
uses, but the State may indeed regulate the acquisition, enjoyment and 
disposition of property. Therefore, absent State regulation and provided the 
use is reasonable egg and sperm donors would have "unlimited" ownership 
rights in the frozen embryo. In the case of divorce such approach would lead 
to further peculiar results – the embryos would be marital property. 
Neither Davis 3 nor Parrillo refer to legal subjects or objects. Rather the 
terminology used refer to "personhood" or "property". Davis 3 concludes 
that embryos fall somewhere on a continuum between a person and 
property while Parrillo simply conveys that such embryos are not property. 
The use of IVF techniques raises sensitive moral and legal questions in a 
dynamic and constantly evolving area95 and it may reasonably be expected 
that the South African legislature and/or courts may shortly be confronted 
with this issue. 
It is suggested that the terms person and property (as applied in the Davis 
decisions) do not allow for explaining the status of the embryo and that 
application of concise legal terminology will contribute to a better 
understanding of the position. Such terminology finds expression in the 
terms legal subject, object and legal subjectivity as set out above and is 
flexible enough to allow for a tenable explanation of the legal nature of the 
embryo. 
The argument is put forward that despite the fact that conception of an 
embryo has taken place artificially and it's being removed from the mother's 
body, it has to be viewed as being included in its parents' legal subjectivity. 
This conclusion follows by analogy from an exposition of the bio-ethical 
                                            
94 Young 1991 Golden Gate UL Rev 584.  
95 It needs to be noted that in a European context there is no consensus on an issue 
related to the one currently under discussion, namely whether the donation of 
embryos not destined for implantation should be permitted. Some European member 
states have adopted a non-prohibitive approach and seventeen of the forty member 
states allow research on human embryonic cell lines. In other states there are no 
regulations but the relevant practices are non-prohibitive. In some states, including 
Latvia, Croatia, Malta and Andorra, there is legislation expressly prohibiting any 
research on embryonic cells. However, in the case of Germany, Austria, Slovakia 
and Italy, research is allowed subject to strict conditions requiring, for instance, that 
the purpose of the research must be to protect the embryo's health. See Parrillo v 
Italy paras 174-176. 
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nature of the parent-child relationship from which it is clear that the legal 
subjectivity of (especially a young) child qua legal subject is interwoven with 
that of its parents. The position of the infant – a legal subject with no 
personal capacity to act – bears out on this conclusion. He or she cannot 
personally conclude any juristic act since the law does not attach any 
consequence to his or her psychological intention; his/her psychological 
intention is not legally recognized. The only way in which an infant can 
participate in legal intercourse is if his/her parent/guardian performs the 
juristic act for him/her and on his/her behalf. It can be said that the parent's 
psychological intention is legally recognized as that of the infant and that 
the infant has acted legally.96 Juridical imputation therefore joins the legal 
actions of one with the rights and duties of the other.97 This explanation does 
not detract from the fact that the infant is a legal subject, however. 
It may therefore be concluded that embryos are not legal subjects sui iuris 
but that does not mean that they are legal objects; the bio-ethical nature of 
the parent-child relationship simply means that as product of a biological 
process the embryos are included in their parents' legal subjectivity.98  
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